Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory

NSF/NBER Math Econ/GE Conference

SAET will be co-sponsoring a conference on Mathematical Economics and General Equilibrium Theory in Iowa City on October 7th, 8th and 9th. The conference is jointly organized by the Henry B. Tippie College of Buisnesss at the University of Iowa in Iowa City. No registration is required. All talks will take place at W401, John Pappajohn Building, Tippie College of Business. Please contact Richard Hislop for more information.

Accomodations are available at the Coralville Marriott Hotel & Conference Center

Conference Program

Friday: 8:50 – 11:00 am

Chair: John Solow

  • Information acquisition and welfare effect in a model of competitive financial markets, Cheng-Zhong Qin (Santa Barbara),
  • On the robustness of the competitive equilibrium: non-utility maximizing behavior and equilibrium points, Subir Chakrabarti (Indiana-Purdue),
  • Using auction theory to study human capital investment in large many-to-many matching markets with heterogeneous agents, Brent Hickman, (Chicago),
  • The economics of web search, Michael Choi (Wisconsin), – joint with Lones Smith (Wisconsin)

Friday: 11:30 am – 12:30 pm

Chair: Ayca Kaya

  • Network bargaining: A search-theoretic approach, Thanh Nguyen (Northwestern),
  • Bargaining with uncertain commitment: On the limits of disagreement, Rohan Dutta (Wash U),

Friday: 1:30 pm – 3:30 pm

Chair: Teddy Kim

  • The dynamics of markups in bidding markets with financial constraints, Pablo Beker (Warwick), – joint with Angel Hernando-Veciana (Universidad Carlos III, Madrid)
  • Dynamic linear economies with social interactions, Onur Ozgur, (Montreal), – joint with Alberto Bisin (NYU)
  • Gift exchange vs monetary exchange: experimental evidence, Daniela Puzzello (Indiana), – joint with John Duffy (Pittsburgh)
  • The (im)possibility of collective risk measurement: Arrovian aggregation of variational preferences, Frederik Herzberg (Bielefeld),

Friday: 4:00 pm – 6:30 pm

Chair: Alice Schoonbroodt

  • Ambiguous language and differences in beliefs, Willemein Kets (Northwestern), – joint with Joseph Y. Halpern (Cornell)
  • Existence of financial quasi-equilibria with restricted participation, Abhishek Ranjan (Paris),, – joint with Bernard Cornet (Paris and Kansas)
  • Other assets' risk: Asset-prices and perceptions of asset-risk, Theodoros Diasakos, (Torino),
  • Endogenous indeterminacy and volatility of asset prices under ambiguity, Michael Mandler (London),
  • Survival and uncertainty through variational preferences, Pietro da Silva (IMPA, Brazil),

Saturday: 9:00 am – 11:00 am

Chair: Forrest Nelson

  • Promoting school competition through school choice: A market design approach, Yusuke Narita (MIT), – joint with John William Hatfield (Stanford) and Fuhito Kojima (Stanford)
  • Improving efficiency in matching markets with regional caps: The case of the Japan Residency Matching Program, Fuhito Kojima (Stanford), – joint with Yuichiro Kamada (Harvard)
  • Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes, Tarun Sabarwal (Kansas), – joint with Roy Sunanda (Iowa State)
  • On the “many more agents than commodities” interpretation of the core-Walras equivalence, Konrad Podczeck (Vienna),

Saturday: 11:30 am – 12:30 pm

Chair: George Neumann

  • Equilibria in overlapping generations model with transfer policies and exogenous growth, Anna Rubinchik, (Haifa), – joint with Jean-Francois Mertens (CORE)
  • Expected utility and equilibrium with subjective choice sets and strategic reporting, Jack Stecher (Carnegie Mellon), – joint with Debora Di Caprio (Toronto) and Francisco J. Santos-Arteaga (Madrid)

Saturday: 1:30 pm – 3:30 pm

Chair: Dan Kovenock

  • Bankruptcy and access to credit in general equilibrium, Matthew Hoelle (Purdue),
  • Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility, Luciano de Castro Filho, (Northwestern),
  • Finance without probability, Frank Riedel (Princeton and Bielefeld),
  • Stopping time games under Knightian uncertainty, Svetlana Boyarchenko (Texas, Austin), – joint with Sergei Levendorskii (Leicester)

Saturday: 4:00 pm – 6:00 pm

Chair: Martin Gervais

  • Spectral conditions for coalitionally robust equilibria in repeated games with positive externalities, Matt Elliot (Stanford), – joint with Benjamin Golub (MIT and Stanford)
  • A constructive study of Markov Equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities, Lukasz Balbus (Warsaw), – joint with Kevin Reffett (ASU) and Lukasz Wozny (Warsaw)
  • Network effects, market structure and industry performance, Rabah Amir (Arizona),
  • On the limitations of monetary policy, M Udara Peiris, (Warwick),, – joint with Herakles Polemarchakis(Warwick) and Alexandros Vardoulakis (Paris)

Conference Dinner:

6:45 pm at Chef’s Table:

Sunday 9:30 – 11:30

Round table discussion on the usefulness, relevance of GE to current affairs and new directions

Coordinator: Nicholas Yannelis

  • Aloisio Araujo,
  • Bernard Cornet,
  • Mark Feldman,
  • Tim Kehoe,
  • David Levine,
  • John Nachbar,
  • Herakles Polemarchakis,
  • Edward C. Prescott,
  • Chris Shannon
  • Wayne Shafer,