Program of the 2007 (VIII) Meeting of
“The Society for the Advancement of
Economic Theory”

Kos, Greece, June 18 – 24, 2007
The Kipriotis Village Resort

The eighth meeting of The Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory took place at the Kipriotis Village Resort which is located on the Greek Isle of Kos in the Aegean Sea.

International Scientific Committee

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Social Program

- June 20, 2007: All day excursion to the island of Nisyros
- June 24, 2007: Social Dinner, 8:30 – 11:00 PM

Sessions

**Monday, June 18, 2007**

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<td>C. D. Alilprantis, E. P. Avgerinos and N. C. Yannelis</td>
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<td>Economies with Asymmetric Information, Part I</td>
<td>N. C. Yannelis</td>
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<td>09:00 – 11:00</td>
<td>Topics in Economic Theory</td>
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<td>Decision Making under Uncertainty, with Applications</td>
<td>J. Werner</td>
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<td>Economies with Asymmetric Information, Part II</td>
<td>N. C. Yannelis</td>
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<td>Topics in General Financial Equilibrium</td>
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<td>Topics in Macro and Monetary Economics</td>
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<td>Public Goods, Public Projects, Externalities, Part I</td>
<td>M. Florenzano</td>
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<td>06:00 – 08:00</td>
<td>Regulation and Markets</td>
<td>G. Deltas and</td>
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<td>D. Moreno</td>
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**Tuesday, June 19, 2007**

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09:00 – 11:00 Auctions and Market Makers, Part I
Entrepreneurship I: Labor and Capital Frictions
International Trade and Factor Mobility
Endogenous Growth and Economic Dynamics
G. Deltas and G. Kosmopoulou
G. Facchini
P. Wang and C. Azariadis

11:30 – 01:30 Auctions and Market Makers, Part II
Entrepreneurship II: Occupational Choice
Public Goods, Public Projects, Externalities, Part II
Political Economy, Part II
G. Deltas and G. Kosmopoulou
A. Villamil
M. Florenzano
F. Squintani

03:30 – 05:30 Logic and Economics, Part I
Social and Economic Networks, Part I
Overlapping Generations Economies
Logic and Economics, Part II
Social and Economic Networks, Part II
Timing Games
M. Kaneko
M. Walzl
D. Bergemann and R. Argenziano
G. Deltas and G. Kosmopoulou

Wednesday, June 20, 2007

Time   Session                              Chair(s)
07:30 – 09:30 Finance Theory                J. H. Boyd

Thursday, June 21, 2007

Time   Session                              Chair(s)
09:00 – 11:00 International Trade, Part I    R. Riezman
Advances in Dynamic Public Finance
Games and Markets
S. Spear
L. Koutsougeras

11:30 – 1:30 International Trade, Part II   R. Riezman
Advances in Dynamic Public Finance and Related
Mechanism Design
Political Economy, Part I
S. Spear
D. Kovenock

03:30 – 5:30 Production Economies and Financial Markets
Functional Analysis and Economic Theory
Asset Pricing
M. Quinzii and M. Magill
C. D. Aliprantis
G. Constantinides

06:00 – 08:00 Learning in Games
Market Structure and Competition
Social Interaction Models and Economic Applications
C. Alós-Ferrer
D. Kovenock and D. Moreno
W. Trockel

Friday, June 22, 2007

Time   Session                              Chair(s)
09:00 – 11:00 Computational Economic Theory
Evolutionary Economics and Finance
Mathematical Economics Part I
Incentives and Organizations
F. Kübler
I. Evstigneev
Y. N. Sun
T. Tsoulouhas

11:30 – 1:30 Mechanism Design and Auctions
Experimental Economics, Part IV
Infinite Horizon Incomplete Markets
Mathematical Economics Part II
A. Manelli
T. Cason
M. Páscoa
Y. N. Sun

03:30 – 05:30 Cost Sharing Mechanisms
Information and Asset Pricing
Banking and Financial Contracting
Auction Theory
T. Roughgarden
J. Werner
N. S. Prescott
P. Monteiro
PRESENTATIONS

Economies with Asymmetric Information, Part I

Chair: N. C. Yannelis

- **L. De Boisdeffre** (U Paris 1, FRANCE; lionel.de.boisdeffre@wanadoo.fr): *The perfect foresights assumption revisited: an existence theorem for a competitive equilibrium with price uncertainty*

- **P. Gourdel** (U Paris 1, FRANCE; Pascal.Gourdel@univ-paris1.fr): *Incomplete markets and monetary policy*
• C. A. Hennessy (U California, Berkeley, USA; hennessy@haas.berkeley.edu), D. Livdan (U Texas, USA) and B. Miranda (UCLA, USA): *A dynamic theory of corporate finance based upon repeated signaling*

*Topics in Economic Theory*

*Chair:* B. Cornet

• **J.-M. Bonnisseau** (U Paris I, FRANCE; jmbonni@univ-paris1.fr): *General equilibrium theory and increasing returns: an alternative to the survival assumption*

• **C. Hara** (Kyoto U, JAPAN; hara@kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp): *Characterizations of the efficient risk-sharing rules in the cases of identical risk attitudes and of multiple goods*

• **K. Reffett** (Arizona State U, USA; kevin.reffett@asu.edu), M. Datta (Arizona State U, USA) and O. Morand (U Connecticut, USA): *Mixed monotone recursive methods*

• **B. Cornet** (U Paris I, U of Kansas, FRANCE-USA; cornet@ku.edu, cornet@univ-paris1.fr): *Spatial economies: a general equilibrium approach*

*Decision Making under Uncertainty, with Applications*

*Chair:* J. Werner

• **M.-L. Vierø** (Queen's U, CANADA; viero@econ.queensu.ca): *Contracting in vague environments*

• **R.-A. Dana** (U Paris-Dauphine, FRANCE; dana@ceremade.dauphine.fr) and C. Le Van (U Paris-1, FRANCE): *Overlapping expectations and the existence of efficient sharing rules and equilibria for variational preference*

*Economies with Asymmetric Information, Part II*

*Chair:* N. C. Yannelis

• **K. Podczeck** (U Vienna, AUSTRIA; konrad.podczeck@univie.ac.at): *Non-existence of Walrasian expectations equilibrium with infinitely many states*

• **R. Tourky** (U Queensland, AUSTRALIA; tourky@uq.edu.au): *The differentially informed risk neutral agent*

• **N. C. Yannelis** (U Illinois Champaign, USA; nyanneli@uiuc.edu): *On the existence, efficiency, implementation and incentive compatibility of the REE*

*Topics in General Financial Equilibrium*

*Chair:* D. Cass

• **F. Taddei** (Columbia U, USA; ft97@columbia.edu): *Liquidity and economic fluctuations*
• L. Carosi (U Pisa, ITALY) and A. Villanacci (U Florence, ITALY; antonio.villanacci@unifi.it): *Endogenous restricted participation in general financial equilibrium*

• J.-F. Mertens (CORE, BELGIUM) and A. Rubinchik (U Colorado, USA; anna.rubinchik@colorado.edu): *Intergenerational equity and the discount rate for cost-benefit analysis*

• D. Cass (U Pennsylvania, USA; dcass@ssc.upenn.edu) and 7 members of an Advanced Seminar in Financial Economics (U Pennsylvania, USA): *Robustness of log-linear utility functions: I. the Walrasian model with pure distribution*

**Topics in Macro and Monetary Economics**

*Chair*: A. Mourmouras

• G. Antinolfi (Washington U-St. Louis, USA; gaetano@wustl.edu) and S. Prasad (U New South Wales, AUSTRALIA): *Commitment, banks and markets*

• M. Bassetto (FRB Chicago, USA; bassetto@nber.org) and V. Lepetyuk (U Minnesota, USA): *Government investment and the European stability and growth pact*

• K. Chen (U Oslo, NORWAY) and Z. Song (Fudan U, CHINA; zsong@fudan.edu.cn): *Capital reallocation, productivity and expectation-driven business cycles*

• L. Barseghyan and R. DiCecio (FRB St. Louis, USA; Riccardo.DiCecio@stls.frb.org): *Heterogeneous firms, productivity, and poverty traps*

**Dynamic Equilibrium Portfolios**

*Chair*: T. Hintermaier

• T. Hintermaier (IHS, AUSTRIA; hinterma@ihs.ac.at) and W. Koeniger (IZA, Germany): *Income risk, durables and collateral loans*

• N. Gârleanu (U of Pennsylvania, USA; garleanu@wharton.upenn.edu): *Portfolio choice and pricing in illiquid markets*

• F. Gomes (London Business School, UK; FGomes@london.edu), A. Michaelides (LSE, UK) and V. Polkovnichenko (U Texas, USA): *Optimal savings with taxable and tax-deferred accounts*

**Real Options**

*Chair*: S. Boyarchenko

• F. Riedel (Bonn U, GERMANY) and X. Su (Bonn U, GERMANY; xia.su@uni-bonn.de): *Irreversible investment*

• S. Boyarchenko (U Texas Austin, USA; sboyarch@eco.utexas.edu): *Firm dynamics in a competitive industry*
Public Goods, Public Projects, Externalities, Part I

Chair: M. Florenzano

- **D. Sonntag** (Chemnitz U, GERMANY; diana.sonntag@wirtschaft.tu-chemnitz.de): Financing vaccine research in developing countries - a public good approach
- **M. Florenzano** (CES, U Paris 1, FRANCE; monique.florenzano@univ-paris1.fr): Equilibrium concepts for a production economy with public goods
- **O. Bos** (PSE, FRANCE; bos@pse.ens.fr): Charity auctions for the happy few
- **N. L. Dromel** (CREST-INSEE, FRANCE; nicolas.dromel@ensae.fr): Fiscal policy, maintenance allowances and expectation-driven business cycles

Regulation and Markets

Chairs: G. Deltas and D. Moreno

- **X. Dassiou** (City U, London, UK; x.dassiou@city.ac.uk): Gaussian demand, set proportions commodity bundling and risk aversion
- **N. Ebel** (U Bielefeld, GERMANY; nebel@wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de) and Y. Lefouili (U Paris I Panthon-Sorbonne, FRANCE): Relative and individual regulation: an investigation of investment incentives under a cost-plus approach
- **T. Papageorgiou** (Yale U, USA; theodore.papageorgiou@yale.edu): Learning your comparative advantage: occupational mobility, wage dynamics and unemployment

Auctions and Market Makers, Part I

Chairs: G. Deltas and G. Kosmopoulou

- J. Gerd Becker (ETH, SWITERLAND) and **D. Damianov** (U Texas Pan American, USA; ddamianov@panam.edu): Auctions with variable supply: uniform price versus discriminatory
- **I. Chakraborty** (National U Singapore, SINGAPORE; indro@nus.edu.sg) and N. Shyamalkumar (U Iowa, USA): A comparative analysis of large multi-unit and bundle auctions
- **V. Mares** (Washington U St. Louis, USA; MARES@WUSTL.EDU): Pre-emption and jump bidding: the case against information aggregation
- **E. Zacharias** (Athens U Economics and Business, GREECE; ezchar@aueb.gr): Convergence to efficiency in asymmetric double auctions

Entrepreneurship I: Labor and Capital Frictions

Chair: M. De Nardi
• A. Erosa (U Toronto, CANADA; andres.erosa@utoronto.ca): On finance as a theory of TFP, cross-industry productivity differences, and economic rents

• N. Herranz (U Illinois, USA), S. Krasa (U Illinois, USA) and A. Villamil (U Illinois, USA; avillami@uiuc.edu): The impact of entrepreneur characteristics and bankruptcy rules on firm performance

• A. Caggese (Pompeu Fabra U, SPAIN; andrea.caggese@upf.edu): Entrepreneurial risk, investment and innovation

• M. Cagetti (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, USA) and M. De Nardi (FRB Chicago, USA; denardim@nber.org): Estate taxation, entrepreneurship and wealth

International Trade and Factor Mobility

Chair: G. Facchini

• M. Aloi (Nottingham U, UK; Marta.Aloi@nottingham.ac.uk) and T. Lloyd-Braga (U Catolica Portuguesa, PORTUGAL): National labor market, international factor mobility and macroeconomic instability

• E. Blanchard (U Virginia, USA; eb8p@virginia.edu) and G. Willmann (U Otago, NEW ZEALAND): Political stasis or protectionist rut? Policy mechanisms for trade reform under democracy

• D. Petropoulou (Oxford U, UK; dimitra.petropoulou@hertford.ox.ac.uk): Vertical product differentiation, minimum quality standards and international trade

• G. Facchini (U Illinois, USA and U degli Studi di Milano, ITALY) and C. Testa (Royal Holloway, U London, UK; cecilia.testa@rhul.ac.uk): Who is against a common market?

Endogenous Growth and Economic Dynamics

Chairs: P. Wang and C. Azariadis

• C. Azariadis (Washington U, USA) and L. Kaas (U Konstanz, GERMANY; Leo.Kaas@unikonstanz.de): Credit market development, growth and volatility

• T. Palivos (U Macedonia, GREECE; tpalivos@uom.gr) and G. Karagiannis (U Macedonia, GREECE): The elasticity of substitution as an engine of growth

• B.-L. Chen (Academia Sinica), H.-J. Chen (National Taiwan U, TAIWAN; hjc@ntu.edu.tw) and P. Wang (Washington U, USA): Public policy and human capital accumulation in an endogenously growing economy with labor-market frictions

Auctions and Market Makers, Part II

Chairs: G. Deltas and G. Kosmopoulou

• Q. Liu (U Oklahoma, USA) and K. Serfes (Drexel U, USA; ks346@drexel.edu): Price discrimination in two-sided markets
• **S. Bose** (U Illinois Urbana-Champaign, USA; bose@uiuc.edu) and A. Daripa (London U, ENGLAND): *Optimal sale: auctions with a buy-now option*

• **G. Deltas** (U Illinois Urbana-Champaign, USA; deltas@uiuc.edu) and T. Jeitschko (Michigan State U, USA): *Auction hosting site competition and market equilibrium with endogenous participation*

• **R. Peeters** (U Maastricht, THE NETHERLANDS; R.Peeters@ALGEC.unimaas.nl): *Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions*

**Entrepreneurship II: Occupational Choice**

*Chair:* A. Villamil

• **K. Athreya** (FRB Richmond, USA; Kartik.Athreya@rich.frb.org) and A. Akyol (York U, CANADA): *Unsecured credit and self-employment*

• **P. Wang** (Washington U St. Louis, USA; pingwang@wustl.edu), N. Jiang (U Massachusetts Lowell, USA) and H. Wu (U Alberta, CANADA): *Ability-heterogeneity, entrepreneurship, and economic growth*

• **G. Vereshchagina** (U Iowa, USA; galina-vereshchagina@uiowa.edu): *Public and private equity in a general equilibrium model of occupational choice*

• **H. Jeong** (USC, USA; hjeong@usc.edu) and R. Townsend (U Chicago, USA): *Sources of TFP growth: occupational choice and financial deepening*

**Public Goods, Public Projects, Externalities, Part II**

*Chair:* M. Florenzano

• **T. Lloyd-Braga** (U Catolica Portuguesa, PORTUGAL; tlb@fcee.ucp.pt), L. Modesto (UCP-FCEE, PORTUGAL) and T. Seegmuller (CES, FRANCE): *Tax rate variability and public spending as sources of indeterminacy*

• **V. Petkov** (Victoria U Wellington, NEW ZEALAND; vladimir.petkov@vuw.ac.nz) and P. Calcott (Victoria U Wellington, NEW ZEALAND): *Transfers between emitters and dynamic externalities*

• **J. M. Bonnisseau** (CES, U Paris 1, FRANCE) and **E. L. del Mercato** (U Salerno and CSEF, ITALY; edmercat@unisa.it): *Externalities, possibility functions and regular economies*

• **J. Bergin** (U College Dublin, IRELAND; berginj@ucd.ie): *Optimal patent length*

**Political Economy, Part II**

*Chair:* F. Squintani

• **J. Duggan** (U Rochester, USA; dugg@mail.rochester.edu) and T. Kalandrakis (U Rochester, USA): *Dynamic legislative policy making*
• **T. Feddersen** (Northwestern U, USA; tfed@kellogg.northwestern.edu), S. Gailmard (Northwestern U, USA) and A. Sandroni (U Pennsylvania, USA): Moral bias in large elections: theory and experimental evidence

• **A. Merlo** (U Pennsylvania, USA; merloa@econ.upenn.edu) and A. Mattozzi (CALTECH, USA): Mediocracy

• P. K. Bag (U Surrey, UK), **H. Sabourian** (U Cambridge, UK; Hamid.Sabourian@econ.cam.ac.uk) and E. Winter (Hebrew U Jerusalem, ISRAEL): Sequential elimination vs. instantaneous voting

**Logic and Economics, Part I**

*Chair:* M. Kaneko

• **M. Kaneko** (U Tsukuba, JAPAN; kaneko@sk.tsukuba.ac.jp): Deductive and inductive inferences in game theoretical situations - cognitive and behavioral bounds

• **J. J. Kline** (Bond U, AUSTRALIA; jekline@bond.edu.au) and M. Kaneko (U Tsukuba, JAPAN): Small and partial views derived from limited experiences

• **R. Ishikawa** (U Tsukuba, JAPAN; isikawa@sk.tsukuba.ac.jp), E. Akiyama (U Tsukuba, JAPAN) and N. Hanaki (U Tsukuba, JAPAN): A simulation study of learning bounds in inductive game theory

**Social and Economic Networks, Part I**

*Chair:* G. Demange

• **G. Demange** (EHESS, PSE, FRANCE; demange@pse.ens.fr): Sharing information in web communities

• **S. Currarini** (U Venezia, ITALY; s.currarini@unive.it), M.O. Jackson (Stanford U, USA) and P. Pin (U Venezia; ITALY): An economic model of friendship: diversity, minorities and segregation

• **P. Kircher** (U Pennsylvania, USA; kircher@econ.upenn.edu): Efficiency of simultaneous search

**Social Insurance**

*Chair:* P. Gottardi

• **L. Fuster** (U. Toronto, CANADA; lfuster@chass.utoronto.ca), A. Imrohoroglu (USC, USA) and S. Imrohoroglu (USC, USA): *Altruism, incomplete markets, and tax reform*

• **K. Chen** (U. Oslo, NORWAY; kaiji.chen@econ.uio.no): *The welfare implication of social security for homeowners*

• **P. Gottardi** (U. Venice, ITALY; gottardi@unive.it) and F. Kübler (U. Pennsylvania and Mannheim; USA and GERMANY): *Social security and risk sharing*
Overlapping Generations Economies

Chair: A. Borglin

- **A. Seghir** (American U Cairo, EGYPT; kseghir@aucegypt.edu) and J. P. Torrez-Martinez (Pontifical Catholic U Rio de Janeiro, BRAZIL): *Wealth transfers and the role of collateral when lifetimes are uncertain*
- **T. Seegmuller** (CNRS and U Paris 1, FRANCE; seegmu@univ-paris1.fr): *Taste for variety and endogenous fluctuations in a monopolistic competition model*
- **J. Shorish** (Institute for Advanced Studies, AUSTRIA and U Illinois Urbana-Champaign, USA; shorish@ihs.ac.at): *Welfare analysis of HIV/AIDS: formulating and computing a continuous time overlapping generations policy model*

Logic and Economics, Part II

Chair: M. Kaneko

- **N.-Y. Suzuki** (Shizuoka U, JAPAN; smnsuzu@ipc.shizuoka.ac.jp): *Intutionistic epistemic logics of shallow depths*
- **X. Luo** (Academia Sinica, TAIWAN; xluo@econ.sinica.edu.tw) and C.-C. Yang (U Rochester, USA): *Bayesian coalitional rationalizability*
- **B. Schipper** (U California, USA; bschipper@ucdavis.edu), A. Heifetz (Tel Aviv U, ISRAEL) and M. Meier (SERVILAB, SPAIN): *Unawareness, beliefs and games*
- **S. Galanis** (U Rochester, USA; spga@troi.cc.rochester.edu): *Awareness and knowledge*

Social and Economic Networks, Part II

Chair: M. Walzl

- **T. Truyts** (K U Leuven, BELGIUM; tom.truyts@econ.kuleuven.be): *Social status in a social structure: Bayesian noisy signaling in networks*
- **T. Hellman** (U Bielefeld, GERMANY; thellmann@wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de): *Evolving networks and games: theory and applications*
- **R. Ilkilic** (U Autonoma de Barcelona, SPAIN; rahmi.ilkilic@idea.uab.es): *Network of commons*
- B. Klaus (U. Maastricht, NETHERLANDS), F. Klijn (U Autonoma de Barcelona, SPAIN) and **M. Walzl** (U Maastricht, NETHERLANDS; m.walzl@algec.unimaas.nl): *The evolution of roommate networks: a comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002)*

Timing Games

Chair: D. Bergemann and R. Arzenziano
M. Reisinger (U Munich, GERMANY) and L. Ressner (U Munich, GERMANY; ludwig.ressner@lrz.uni-muenchen.de): Dynamic duopoly with inattentive firms

G. Caruana (CEMFI, SPAIN) and L. Einav (Stanford U, USA; leinav@stanford.edu): Production targets

R. Argenziano (U Essex, UK; rargenz@essex.ac.uk) and P. Schmidt-Dengler (LSE, UK): N-player preemption games

H. Hopenhayn (UCLA, USA) and F. Squintani (U Brescia, ITALY and ELSE, UK; squintan@eco.unibs.it): Patent rights and innovation disclosure

Auctions and Market Makers, Part III

Chairs: G. Deltas and G. Kosmopoulou

C. Mezzetti (U Leicester, ENGLAND; cm174@leicester.ac.uk): Aversion to price risk and the afternoon effect

J. Lu (National U Singapore, SINGAPORE; ecsljf@nus.edu.sg): When and how to dismantle nuclear weapons: auction design with externalities

Finance Theory

Chair: J. H. Boyd

R. Mehra (NBER and UC Santa Barbara, USA; mehra@econ.ucsb.edu) and E. C. Prescott (FRB Minneapolis and Arizona State U, USA): Intermediated quantities and returns

K. Bhanot (U Texas-Austin, USA) and A. S. Mello (U Wisconsin, USA; amello@bus.wisc.edu): Should production and trading activities be separated?

J.-P. Danthine (U Lausanne, SWITZERLAND; Jean-Pierre.Danthine@unil.ch) and X. Jin (Hong Kong Monetary Authority, HONG KONG): Intangible capital, corporate valuation and asset pricing

J. H. Boyd (U Minnesota, USA; jboyd@csom.umn.edu) and H. Hakenes (Max Planck Institute, GERMANY): Looting and gambling in banking crises

International Trade, Part I

Chair: R. Riezman

S. Bougheas (U Nottingham, UK; spiros.bougheas@nottingham.ac.uk), R. Kneller (U Nottingham, UK) and R. Riezman (U Iowa, USA): Optimal education policy and comparative advantage

E. Bond (Vanderbilt U, USA) and C. Syropoulos (Drexel U, USA; constantinos.a.syropoulos@drexel.edu): Is the tariff the 'mother of trusts'? Reciprocal trade liberalization with multimarket collusion
• C. Davidson (Michigan State U, USA), S. Matusz (Michigan State U, USA) and D. Nelson (Tulane U, USA; dnelson@tulane.edu): *Unemployment, fairness and the political economy of trade policy*

• R. Jones (U Rochester, USA; jonr@troi.cc.rochester.edu) and S. Marjit (City U Hong Kong, CHINA): *International trade models and real world features*

**Advances in Dynamic Public Finance**

*Chair:* S. Spear

• B. Grochulski (Richmond Federal Reserve Bank, USA; Borys.Grochulski@rich.frb.org): Optimal personal bankruptcy design: a mirrlees approach

• L. Bossi (U Miami, USA), P. Gomis-Porqueras (U Miami, USA; gomis@miami.edu) and D. Kelly (U Miami, USA): Optimal second-best taxation of addictive goods

• C. Sleet (Carnegie Mellon U, USA; csleet@andrew.cmu.edu) and S. Yeltekin (Carnegie Mellon U, USA): *Politically sustainable social Insurance*

**Games and Markets**

*Chair:* L. Koutsougeras

• P. Csoka (U Maastricht, NETHERLANDS; P.Csoka@algec.unimaas.nl), P. J.-J. Herings (U Maastricht, NETHERLANDS) and L. A. Koczy (U Maastricht, NETHERLANDS): *Risk allocation and totally balanced games*

• A. Dickson (U Manchester, UK; alex.dickson@manchester.ac.uk) and R. Hartley (U Manchester, UK): *The strategic Marshallian cross*

• N. Ziros (U Manchester, UK; nicolaos.ziros@manchester.ac.uk): *Strategic market games with differential information*

**International Trade, Part II**

*Chair:* R. Riezman

• E. Dinopoulos (U Florida, USA, elias.dinopoulos@cba.ufl.edu), K. Fujiwara (Kwansei Gakuin U, JAPAN) and K. Shimomura (Kobe U, JAPAN): *International trade patterns under quasi-linear preferences*

• H. Egger (U Zurich, SWITZERLAND; egger@wwi.unizh.ch), and U. Kreickemeier (U Nottingham, UK): *Firm heterogeneity and the labour market effects of trade liberalisation*

• N. Chau (Cornell U, USA, hyc3@cornell.edu) and R. Fare (Oregon State U, USA): *Directional trade distance function: Theory and applications*

• K. Yilmaz (Koc U, TURKEY, kyilmaz@ku.edu.tr) and S. Ozler (UCLA, USA): *Foreign direct investment and productivity spillovers: Identifying linkages through product-based measures*
Advances in Dynamic Public Finance and Related Mechanism Design

Chair: S. Spear

- **M. Battaglini** (Princeton U, USA; mbattagl@princeton.edu) and S. Coate (Cornell U, USA): *A dynamic theory of public spending, taxation and debt*
- **Y. Zhang** (U Iowa, USA; yuzhe-zhang@uiowa.edu): *Optimal unemployment insurance with hidden borrowing and lending*
- **C. Bevia** (U autonoma de Barcelona, SPAIN; carmen.bevia@uab.es) and L. Corchon (U Carlos 3, SPAIN): *Cooperative production and efficiency*
- **L. Panaccione** (Luiss Guido Carli, ITALY; lpanaccione@luiss.it): *Pareto optima and competitive equilibria with moral hazard and financial markets*

Political Economy, Part I

Chair: D. Kovenock

- D. Dimitrov (U Bielefeld, GERMANY) and **C.-J. Haake** (U Bielefeld, GERMANY; chaake@wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de): *Stable governments and the semistrict core*
- **M. Azzimonti** (U Iowa, USA; marina-azzimonti@uiowa.edu), M. Battaglini (Princeton U, USA) and S. Coate (Cornell U, USA): *Starving the Leviathan: a dynamic analysis of fiscal constitutions*
- **D. Kovenock** (Purdue U, USA; kovenock@purdue.edu) and B. Roberson (Miami U, USA): *Coalitional Colonel Blotto games with application to the economics of alliances*

Production Economies and Financial Markets

Chairs: M. Quinzii and M. Magill

- D. Coen Pirani (Carnegie Mellon U, USA) and **E. Carceles Poveda** (SUNY Stony Brook, USA; ecarcelespov@notes.cc.sunysb.edu): *Capital ownership under incomplete markets: does it matter*
- J. Dreze (U Catholique de Louvain, BELGIUM) and **E. Minelli** (U di Brescia, ITALY; minelli@eco.unibs.it): *Shareholder efficient production plans in a multi period economy*
- **M. Magill** (U Southern California, USA; magill@usc.edu) and M. Quinzii (U California Davis, USA): *A statistical approach to general equilibrium with production*

Functional Analysis and Economic Theory

Chair: C. D. Aliprantis

- **J. Morgan** (U Napoli Federico II, Italy; morgan@unina.it) and V. Scalzo (U Napoli Federico II, Italy): *Existence of equilibria in abstract economies via pseudocontinuity*
• **I. A. Polyrakis** (National Technical U, Greece; ypoly@math.ntua.gr): *Positive bases and the completion by options in security markets*

• **V. N. Katsikis** (National Technical U, Greece; vaskats@gmail.com): *Computational methods in portfolio insurance*

• **N. E. Sofronidis** (U Crete, GREECE; sofnik@otenet.gr): *Topological upper limits of mixed Nash equilibria*

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**Asset Pricing**

Chair: G. Constantinides

• **S. Panageas** (U Pennsyluania, USA; panageas@wharton.upenn.edu) and N. Garleanu (Wharton, USA): *Young, old, conservative and bold*

• **S. S. Lee** (Georgia Institute of Technology, USA; Suzanne.Lee@mgt.gatech.edu): *Jumps and information flow in financial markets*

• **S. Levendorskii** (U Texas Austin, USA; leven@eco.utexas.edu) and S. Boyarchenko (U Texas Austin, USA): *American options in regime-switching models*

• **A. Ghosh** (London School of Economics, UK; A.Ghosh@lse.ac.uk) and G. M. Constantinides (GSB, U Chicago, USA): *Asset pricing tests with long run risks in consumption growth*

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**Learning in Games**

Chair: C. Alós-Ferrer

• J. Renault (U Paris Dauphine, FRANCE), **M. Scarsini** (LUISS, ITALY; marco.scarsini@luiss.it) and T. Tomala (U Paris Dauphine, FRANCE): *Playing off-line games with bounded rationality*

• **C. Kuzmics** (Northwestern U, USA; c-kuzmics@kellogg.northwestern.edu): *On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations*

• **U. Berger** (Vienna U of Business and Economics, AUSTRIA; ulrich.berger@wu-wien.ac.at): *Fictitious play learning in potential games and games with strategic complementarities*

• **C. Alós-Ferrer** (U Konstanz, GERMANY; carlos.alos-ferrer@uni-konstanz.de) and N. Netzer (U Konstanz, GERMANY): *The logit-response dynamics*

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**Market Structure and Competition**

Chairs: D. Kovenock and D. Moreno

• M. Möller (U Carlos III Madrid, SPAIN) and **M. Watanabe** (U Carlos III Madrid, SPAIN; mwatanab@eco.uc3m.es): *Should a monopolist sell before or after buyers know their demands?*
• **P. Jara-Moroni** (U de Chile, CHILE and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques, FRANCE; pjara@dim.uchile.cl): *Stackelberg game with quantity precommitment*

• J. Dearmon (U Oklahoma, USA) and **G. Kosmopoulou** (U Oklahoma, USA; georgiak@ou.edu): *Sequential location and price choices in two-dimensional spatial competition*

• E. Einy (Ben-Gurion U, ISRAEL), O. Haimanko (Ben-Gurion U, ISRAEL), **D. Moreno** (U Carlos III Madrid, SPAIN; dmoreno@eco.uc3m.es) and B. Shitovitz (U of Haifa, ISRAEL): *On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium*

**Social Interaction Models and Economic Applications**

*Chair:* W. Trockel

• **B. Allen** (U Minnesota, USA; assist@econ.umn.edu): *The spread of computer viruses*

• **S. von Widekind** (U Bielefeld, GERMANY; svenvon.widekind@uni-bielefeld.de): *Evolution of non-expected utility preferences*

• **W. Kets** (U Tilburg, THE NETHERLANDS; w.kets@uvt.nl): *Continuity of beliefs in network games*

• **M. U. Ünver** (U Pittsburgh, USA; uunver@pitt.edu): *Dynamic kidney exchange*

**Computational Economic Theory**

*Chair:* F. Kübler

• K. L. Judd (Hoover Institution, USA) and **C.-L. Su** (Northwestern U, USA; c-su@kellogg.nwu.edu): *Constrained optimization approaches to estimation of structural models*

• **Y. Algan** (PSE-CEPREMAP, FRANCE; yann.algan@univ-mlv.fr), O. Allais (INRA-CORELA, FRANCE) and W. Den Haan (U Amsterdam, HOLLAND): *Solving heterogeneous-agent models with parameterized cross-sectional distributions*

• F. Kübler (U Penn, USA) and **K. Schmedders** (Northwestern U, USA; k-schmedders@kellogg.northwestern.edu): *Uniqueness of equilibria in semi-algebraic economies*

**Evolutionary Economics and Finance**

*Chair:* I. Evstigneev

• **I. Evstigneev** (U Manchester, UK; igor.evstigneev@manchester.ac.uk), T. Hens (U Zurich, SWITZERLAND) and K. R. Schenk-Hoppè (U Leeds, UK): *Evolutionary dynamics and temporary equilibrium in financial markets*

• **R. Amir** (U Arizona, USA; ramir@eller.arizona.edu), I. Evstigneev (U Manchester, UK) and K. R. Schenk-Hoppè (U Leeds, UK): *Evolutionary finance and dynamic games*
• S. D. Flåm (U Bergen, NORWAY; Sjur.Flaam@econ.uib.no) and O. Godal (U Bergen, NORWAY): On market evolution and price formation

• E. De Giorgi (U Lugano, U Zurich, SWITZERLAND; enrico.degiorgi@lu.unisi.ch): Evolutionary portfolio selection with liquidity shocks

Mathematical Economics Part I

Chair: Y. N. Sun

• J. K. H. Quah (U Oxford, UK; john.quah@economics.ox.ac.uk) and B. Strulovici (U Oxford, UK): Comparative statics with the interval dominance order

• O. Board (U Pittsburgh, USA) and K. S. Chung (U Hong Kong, HONG KONG; sau@econ.hku.hk): Object-based unawareness

• G. Hahn (Korea Economic Research Institute, SOUTH KOREA) and D. C. Won (Ajou U Suwon, SOUTH KOREA; dcwon@ajou.ac.kr): Constrained asset markets

• Y. N. Sun (National U Singapore, SINGAPORE; ynsun@nus.edu.sg): Characterizations of individual risks and Fubini extension

Incentives and Organizations

Chair: T. Tsoulouhas

• P. Lopomo (Duke U, USA; glopomo@duke.edu), L. Rigotti (Duke University, USA) and C. Shannon (UC-Berkeley, USA): Uncertainty in mechanism design

• J. Song (U Essex, UK; joonsong@essex.ac.uk): Futures market: contractual agreement to restrain moral hazard in teams

• M. Kolmar (U St. Gallen, SWITZERLAND) and D. Sisak (U St. Gallen, SWITZERLAND; dana.sisak@unisg.ch): Multi-prize contests as incentive mechanisms for the provision of public goods with heterogeneous agents

• K. Marinakis (North Carolina State U, USA) and T. Tsoulouhas (North Carolina State U, USA; fanis_tsoulouhas@ncsu.edu): Are tournaments optimal over piece rates under limited liability for the principal?

Mechanism Design and Auctions

Chair: A. Manelli

• A. Manelli (Arizona State U, USA; ale@asu.edu) and D. Vincent (U Maryland, USA): Bayesian versus dominant strategy incentive compatibility in the independent private values model

• W. Fuchs (U Chicago, USA; wfuchs@uchicago.edu) and A. Skrzypacz (Standord U, USA): Bargaining with arrival of new traders
• **R. Burguet** (Instituto de Análisis Economico, SPAIN; roberto.burguet@iae.csic.es) and P. McAfee (Caltech and Yahoo Research, USA): *License prices for financially constrained firms*

• **P. Klinger Monteiro** (FGV-EPGE, BRAZIL; paulo.klinger@fgv.br) and B. Fux Svaiter (IMPA, BRAZIL): *Optimal auction with a general distribution: virtual valuation without a density*

**Experimental Economics, Part IV**

Chair: T. Cason

• E. Danan (U Cergy-Pontoise, FRANCE) and **A. Ziegelmeyer** (Max Planck Institute of Economics, GERMANY; ziegelmeyer@econ.mpg.de): *Are preferences complete? An experimental measurement of indecisiveness under risk*

• **H. Kelley** (U Copenhagen, DENMARK; huk@foi.dk): *A complementary agent based simulation and human experiment approach to studying cooperation in spatial resource use settings*

**Infinite Horizon Incomplete Markets**

Chair: M. Páscoa

• A. Araujo (IMPA and FGV, BRAZIL), R. Novinski (IMPA, BRAZIL) and **M. Páscoa** (U N Lisboa, PORTUGAL; pascoa@fe.unl.pt): *Knightian asset price bubbles*

• **J. P. Torres-Martinez** (PUC-RJ, BRAZIL; jptorres_martinez@econ.puc-rio.br) and E. Moreno-Garcia (U Salamanca, SPAIN): *Infinite horizon incomplete markets: borrowing constraints versus debt constraints*

• **A. Araujo** (IMPA and FGV, BRAZIL; aloisio@impa.br) and B. Funchal (FUCAPE, BRAZIL): *How much debtor's punishment?*

• **G. Carmona** (U Nova de Lisboa, PORTUGAL; gcarmona@fe.unl.pt) and H. Sabourian (U Cambridge, ENGLAND): *Dynamic risk sharing and complexity*

**Mathematical Economics Part II**

Chair: Y. N. Sun

• **M. Ali Khan** (Johns Hopkins U, USA; akhan@jhu.edu) and K. P. Rath (U Notre Dame, USA): *On the extensions of Lyapunov's Theorem: a synthetic treatment*

• **C. H. Yeh** (Academia Sinica and National Central U, TAIWAN; chyth@econ.sinica.edu.tw): *Secured lower bound, composition up, and minimal rights first for bankruptcy problems*

• **H. K. Koo** (Ajou U Suwon, SOUTH KOREA; hkoo@ajou.ac.kr), G. Shim (The Bank of Korea, SOUTH KOREA) and J. Sung (U Illinois Chicago, USA): *Hierarchical contract, firm size, and pay sensitivity*
- J. A. Mirrlees (U Cambridge, UK, and Chinese U Hong Kong, HONG KONG), and **R. Raimondo** (U Melbourne, AUSTRALIA; raimondo@econ.unimelb.edu.au): *Strategies in the principal-agent model*

**Cost Sharing Mechanisms**

**Chair:** T. Roughgarden

- S. Chawla (Stanford U, USA), **T. Roughgarden** (Stanford U, USA; tim@theory.stanford.edu) and M. Sundararajan (Stanford U, USA): *Optimal cost sharing mechanisms*
- A. Goldberg (Microsoft, USA) and **J. Hartline** (Microsoft, USA; hartline@microsoft.com): *Collusion resistant mechanism design*
- **R. Juarez** (Rice U, USA; ruben@rice.edu): *Group strategy proof cost sharing*

**Information and Asset Pricing**

**Chair:** J. Werner

- **H. K. K. Eraslan** (U Pennsylvania, USA; eraslan@wharton.upenn.edu) and P. Bond (U Pennsylvania, USA): *Information-based trade*
- **R. T. Coury** (Oxford U, UK; tarek.coury@economics.oxford.ac.uk) and D. Easley (Cornell U, USA): *Implications of rationality in asset markets*
- **F. Sangiorgi** (Collegio Carlo Alberto, ITALY; francesco.sangiorgi@collegiocarloalberto.it) and D. Garcia (U North Carolina, USA): *Information sales and strategic trading*
- **J. Werner** (U Minnesota, USA; jwerner@econ.umn.edu) and H. Ozsoylev (Oxford U, UK): *Liquidity and asset prices in rational expectations equilibrium with ambiguous information*

**Banking and Financial Contracting**

**Chair:** N. S. Prescott

- **Y. Leitner** (FRB Philadelphia, USA; yaron.leitner@frb.phil.org): *A theory of an intermediary with nonexclusive contracts*
- **H. Hopenhayn** (UCLA, USA; hopen@econ.ucla.edu) and I. Werning (MIT, USA): *Equilibrium default with limited commitment*
- **A. Jarque** (U Alicante, SPAIN; jarque@merlin.fae.ua.es): *Optimal stock option repricing: incentives and learning*
- P. Bond (U Pennsylvania, USA), I. Goldstein (U Pennsylvania, USA) and **E. S. Prescott** (FRB Richmond, USA; edward.prescott@rich.frb.org): *Market-based regulation and the informational content of prices*
Auction Theory

Chair: P. Monteiro

- **R. Zubrickas** (Stockholm School of Economics, SWEDEN; robertas.zubrickas@hhs.se): *Optimal grading*
- S. Loertscher (U Melbourne, AUSTRALIA) and **A. Niedermayer** (U Bern, SWITZERLAND; niedermayer@wwi.unibe.ch): *Intermediation with percentage fees*
- **A. Hernando-Veciana** (U Carlos III de Madrid, SPAIN; angel.hernando@uc3m.es) and F. Michelucci (Caltech, USA): *Second best efficiency in auctions*
- **D. Selman** (U Pennsylvania, USA; denizs@econ.upenn.edu): *Coordination frictions and heterogeneity in markets with bidding*

Open Economy Macroeconomics

Chairs: W. Fisher and J. Shorish

- **B. J. Heijdra** (U Groningen, NETHERLANDS; b.j.heijdra@rug.nl) and W. Romp (U Groningen, NETHERLANDS): *Ageing and growth in the small open economy*
- **P. Broer** (Netspar, Tilburg U, NETHERLANDS; D.P.Broer@cpb.nl): *Social security risk in a CGE model of a small open economy*
- **W. H. Fisher** (IHS-Vienna, AUSTRIA; fisher@ihs.ac.at): *Relative wealth and sectoral adjustment*

Testable Implications of Rationality and Equilibrium

Chair: A. Carvajal

- **F. Forges** (U Paris-Dauphine, FRANCE; francoise.forges@dauphine.fr) and E. Minelli (U Brescia, ITALY): *Afriat's theorem for general budget sets*
- **F. Kübler** (U Pennsylvania, USA; kubler@sas.upenn.edu) and K. Schmedders (Norhtwestern U, USA): *Non-parametric comparative statics in dynamic general equilibrium*
- **J. Dávila** (U Paris-Sorbonne, FRANCE; julio.davila@univ-paris1.fr): *Expectations formation and volatility*
- **A. Carvajal** (U Warwick, UK; a.m.carvajal@warwick.ac.uk): *On refutability of the Nash-Walras equilibrium hypothesis*

Economic Development and Growth

Chair: S. L. Parente

- **B. Herrendorf** (Arizona State U, USA; Berthold.Herrendorf@asu.edu): *Growth and structural transformation*
• A. Erosa (U Toronto, CANADA), **T. Koreshkova** (Concordia U, CANADA; tkoreshk@alcor.concordia.ca) and D. Restuccia (U Toronto, CANADA): *How important is human capital?: a quantitative theory assessment of world income inequality*

• K. Desmet (U Carlos III, SPAIN and CEPR, FRANCE) and **S. L. Parente** (U Illinois, USA; parente@uiuc.edu): *Why England first?: the end of resistance and the start of the revolution*

• **E. Färnstrand Damsgaard** (IIES, SWEDEN; erika@iies.su.se) and P. Krusell (Princeton U, USA and IIES, SWEDEN): *The world distribution of income: country TFP choice in a Nelson-Phelps world*

\paragraph*{Topics in Financial Stability}
\textit{Chair:} D. Tsomocos

• **R. A. Espinoza** (U Oxford, UK; raphael.espinoza@christ-church.oxford.ac.uk), C. A. E. Goodhart (LSE, UK) and D. P. Tsomocos (U Oxford, UK): *Endogenous state-prices, liquidity, default, and the yield curve*

• **A. Kamesaka** (Aoyama Gakuin U, JAPAN; akiko@busi.aoyama.ac.jp) and J. Wang (U New South Wales, AUSTRALIA): *The Asian crisis and investor behavior in Thailand’s equity market*

• A. Guembel (U Oxford, UK) and **O. Sussman** (U Oxford, UK; oren.sussman@said-business-school.oxford.ac.uk): *Sovereign debt without default penalties*

• C. Pederzoli (U Milano-Bicocca, ITALY), **C. Torricelli** (U Modena and Reggio Emilia, ITALY; costanza.torricelli@unimore.it) and D. Tsomocos (U Oxford, UK): *Banks’ optimal rating systems and procyclicality in a general equilibrium framework*

\paragraph*{Experimental Economics, Part I}
\textit{Chair:} C. R. Plott

• **S. Crockett** (CUNY, USA; Sean_Crockett@baruch.cuny.edu) and J. Duffy (U Pittsburg, USA): *Lucas in the laboratory*

• **J. Huber** (U Innsbruck, AUSTRIA; juergen.huber@uibk.ac.at), M. Shubik (Yale U, USA) and S. Sunder (Yale U, USA): *Three minimal strategic games: theory and experimental evidence*

• R. M. Isaac (Florida State U, USA), **S. Pevnitskaya** (Florida State U, USA; spevnitskaya@mailer.fsu.edu) and K. Schnier (U Rhode Island, USA): *Bidder behavior in sealed bid auctions where the number of bidders is unknown*

• **M. Alton** (Caltech, USA; mralon@hss.caltech.edu) and C. R. Plott (Caltech, USA): *Continuous, random arrival markets: a new experimental environment for the study of prices and allocations*

\paragraph*{Corporate Control and the Theory of the Firm}
\textit{Chair:} K. Ritzberger
• **A. Dhillon** (Warwick U, UK; A.Dhillon@warwick.ac.uk) and S. Rossetto (Warwick U, UK): *Corporate control and multiple large shareholders*

• **S. Demichelis** (U Pavia, ITALY; sdm.golem@gmail.com) and K. Ritzberger (Inst. for Advanced Studies, AUSTRIA): *Corporate control and the stock market*

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**Functional Analysis and Economic Theory II**

*Chair:* E. P. Avgerinos

• **N. Papanastassiou** (U Athens, GREECE; npapanas@math.uoa.gr) and C. Papachristodoulou: *On the convergence of measurable functions*

• **N. Englezos** (U Athens, GREECE; englezos@math.uoa.gr): *On utility maximalization: dynamic programming and stochastic PDE's*

• **E. P. Avgerinos** (U Aegean, GREECE; eavger@aegean.gr): *On differential variational inequalities and applications*

• **V. Farmaki** (U Athens, GREECE; vfarmak@math.uoa.gr): *Ramsey type partition theorems*

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**Experimental Economics, Part II**

*Chair:* T Cason

• **J. Engle-Warnick** (McGill U, CANADA; jim.engle-warnick@mcgill.ca): *An experimental test of the ability of subjects to fit repeated-game strategies to choice data*

• **N. Nikiforakis** (U Melbourne, AUSTRALIA; n.nikiforakis@unimelb.edu.au): *Cooperation, punishment and information effects*

• W. Z. Ehrblatt (New York U, USA), K. Hyndman (Southern Methodist U, USA), E. Özbay (New York U, USA) and **A. Schotter** (New York U, USA; Andrew.schotter@nyu.edu): *Convergence: an experimental study of teaching and learning in repeated game*

• **T. Cason** (Purdue U, USA; cason@purdue.edu), D. Friedman (U California-Santa Cruz, USA) and E. Hopkins (U Edinburgh, UK): *Testing the TASP: an experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria*

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**Noncooperative Group Formation, Part I**

*Chair:* M. Wooders

• F. Bloch (GREQUAM, FRANCE) and **F. Diamantoudi** (Concordia U, CANADA; ediamant@alcor.concordia.ca): *Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games*

• K. Konrad (Berlin U, GERMANY) and **W. Leininger** (Dortmund U, GERMANY; wolfgang.leininger@uni-dortmund.de): *Norms and the efficient organization of clans*

• **V. Groenert** (Vanderbilt U, USA; valeska.n.gronert@vanderbilt.edu): *Coordination-free equilibrium*
• **H. Imai** (Kyoto U, JAPAN; imai@kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp): *Sequential bargaining and coalition formation*

**Economic Growth**

*Chair:* C. Ghiglino

• **M. Boldrin** (Washington U St Louis, USA; mboldrin@artsci.wustl.edu) and D. Levine (Washington U St Louis, USA): *Full appropriation and innovation*
• **G. Sorger** (U Vienna, AUSTRIA; gerhard.sorger@univie.ac.at): *Horizontal innovations with endogenous quality choice*
• **P. Peretto** (Duke U, USA; peretto@econ.duke.edu): *Energy taxes and endogenous technological change*
• **C. Ghiglino** (U Essex, UK; cghig@essex.ac.uk): *Random walk to innovation*

**Experimental Economics, Part III**

*Chair:* C. Noussair

• **N. Georgantzis** (U Jaume I, SPAIN; georgant@eco.uji.es), A. Garcia-Gallego (U Jaume I, SPAIN) and P. Kujal (U Carlos III, SPAIN): *Experimental insights on alternative water management institutions*
• **O. Shurchkov** (MIT, USA; oshurchk@mit.edu): *Coordination and learning in dynamic global games: experimental evidence*
• **J. Stecher** (Norges Handelshoyeskole NHH, NORWAY; Jack.Stecher@nhh.no): *Generating ambiguity in the laboratory*
• **C. Noussair** (Tilburg U, NETHERLANDS; C.N.Noussair@uvt.nl) and J.-R. Tyran (U Copenhagen, DENMARK): *Monetary shocks in experimental asset markets*

**Monetary Theory, Part I**

*Chair:* D. Puzzello

• C. Aliprantis (Purdue U, USA), G. Camera (Purdue U, USA) and **D. Puzzello** (U. Kentucky, USA; Daniela.Puzzello@uky.edu): *Anonymous markets and monetary trading*
• **M. Galenianos** (Pennsylvania State U, USA; manolis@psu.edu) and P. Kircher (U Pennsylvania, USA): *A model of money with multilateral matching*
• **R. Cavalcanti** (Getulio Vargas Foundation, BRAZIL; Ricardo.Cavalcanti@fgv.br) and E. Nosal (Federal Reserve Bank Cleveland, USA): *Counterfeiting as private money in mechanism design*

**Asset Markets and Macroeconomics**
Chair: E. Espino

- **P. Gomme** (Concordia U, CANADA; paul.gomme@concordia.ca), B. Ravikumar (U Iowa, USA) and P. Rupert (Federal Reserve Bank Cleveland, USA): *The return to capital and the business cycle*
- **M. Boileau** (U Colorado Boulder, USA; Martin.Boileau@Colorado.EDU) and M. Normandin (HEC, CANADA): *Dynamics of the current account and interest differentials*
- P. Beker (U Alicante, SPAIN) and **E. Espino** (U Tella, ARGENTINA; eespino@utdt.edu): *Efficient asset trading with heterogeneous beliefs*
- R. Rahi (LSE, UK) and **J. P. Zigrand** (LSE, UK; j.p.zigrand@lse.ac.uk): *Arbitrage networks*

**Dynamic General Equilibrium Theory**

Chair: M. Tvede

- **A. Citanna** (HEC, FRANCE; citanna@hec.fr): *Recursive equilibrium in stochastic OLG economies*
- **T. Markeprand** (U Copenhagen, DENMARK; tobias.markeprand@econ.ku.dk) and M. Tvede (U Copenhagen, DENMARK): *Volatility in economies with incomplete financial markets*
- **Y. Balasko** (U York, UK; yb501@york.ac.uk): *The relationship between short-run and long-run efficiency*
- **M. Tvede** (U Copenhagen, DENMARK; mich.tvede@econ.ku.dk): *Cycles and stationary sunspot equilibria in OG economies*

**Monetary Theory, Part II**

Chair: G. Antinolfi

- **C. D. Aliprantis** (Purdue U, USA; aliprantis@mgmt.purdue.edu) and G. Camera (Purdue U, USA): *Monetary equilibrium and the differentiability of the value function*
- **M. Hoerova** (European Central Bank, GERMANY; marie.hoerova@ecb.int), C. Monnet (European Central Bank, GERMANY) and T. Temzelides (U Pittsburgh, USA): *Financial stability and monetary policy*
- **V. Bencivenga** (U Texas Austin, USA; vrbencivenga@gmail.com) and G. Camera (Purdue U, USA): *Banks and liquidity insurance in a matching model of money*

**Foundations of Matching Economies**

Chair: D. Puzzello

- **R. Molzon** (U Kentucky, USA; molzon@ms.uky.edu) and D. Puzzello (U Kentucky and U Illinois Champaign, USA): *Random matching models with limited information*
• **A. Botelho** (U Minho and Nima, PORTUGAL; botelho@eeg.uminho.pt), G. Harrison (U Central Florida, USA), L. Pinto (U Minho and Nima, PORTUGAL), and E. Rutström (U Central Florida, USA): *Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments: a case study of public goods*

• **A. Penta** (U Pennsylvania, USA; penta@sas.upenn.edu): *Alternating auctioneers and Walrasian equilibrium*

• **T. Andersson** (Lund U, SWEDEN; Tommy.Andersson@nek.lu.se) and L.-G. Svensson (Lund U, SWEDEN): *Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness*

**General Equilibrium Theory**

*Chair:* C. Herves-Beloso

• **J. Correia da Silva** (U Porto, PORTUGAL; Joao@fep.up.pt) and C. Hervés-Beloso (U Vigo, SPAIN): *Rational expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery*

• **M. Faias** (U Nova de Lisboa, PORTUGAL; mcm@fct.unl.pt) and E. M. García (U de Salamanca, SPAIN): *Incomplete financial markets and information*

• W. Daher (U Paris-1, FRANCE), V. F. Martins-da-Rocha (U Paris–Dauphine, FRANCE), M. Páscoa (U Nova de Lisboa, PORTUGAL) and **Y. Vailakis** (U of Exeter, UK; Y.Vailakis@exeter.ac.uk): *Sequential trading without perfect foresight: the role of default and collateral*

• C. Hervés-Beloso (U Vigo, SPAIN) and **E. Moreno García** (U Salamanca, SPAIN; emmam@usal.es): *Large economies and two-player games*

**Bargaining Theory**

*Chair:* P. J. J. Herings

• **H. Houba** (Vrije U and Tinbergen Institute, NETHERLANDS; hhouba@feweb.vu.nl) and Q. Wen (Vanderbilt U, USA): *Perfect equilibria in a negotiation model with different time preferences*

• P. J. J. Herings (Maastricht U, NETHERLANDS) and **A. Predtetchinski** (Maastricht U, NETHERLANDS; A.Predtetchinski@algec.unimaas.nl): *One-dimensional bargaining*

**Money and Banking**

*Chair:* T. Temzelides

• **H. Ennis** (Federal Reserve Bank Richmond, USA; huberto.ennis@rich.frb.org) and T. Keister (Federal Reserve Bank New York, USA): *Commitment and equilibrium bank runs*

• **A. Martin** (Federal Reserve Bank New York, USA; antoine.martin@ny.frb.org) and J. McAndrews (Federal Reserve Bank New York, USA): *Liquidity saving mechanisms*
Expanding the Boundaries of Economic Analysis

Chair: M. Boldrin

- **A. Bisin** (New York U, USA; alberto.bisin@nyu.edu) and O. Ozgur (U Montreal, CANADA): *Rational social interaction*
- **S. Brusco** (State U New York-Stony Brook, USA; sbrusco@notes.cc.sunysb.edu), J. J. Anton (Duke U, USA) and G. Lopomo (Duke U, USA): *Coordination in split-award auctions with uncertain scale economies: theory and data*
- H. Fang (Yale, USA), **A. Moro** (Federal Reserve Bank NY, USA; andrea@andreamoro.net) and G. Topa (Federal Reserve Bank NY, USA): *Risk sharing, informal networks and living arrangements*
- A. Bisin (New York U, USA), A. Moro (Federal Reserve Bank NY, USA) and **G. Topa** (Federal Reserve Bank NY, USA; giorgio.topa@ny.frb.org): *The empirical content of models with multiple equilibria: theory and applications*

Contributions to Economic Theory

Chair: P. Madden

- **A. Andrikopoulos** (Ioannina U, GREECE; aandriko@cc.uoi.gr): *General extension theorems for binary relations*
- **A. D’Agata** (Catania U, ITALY; adagata@unict.it): *Conspicuous consumption foundations to consumer preferences*
- **P. Madden** (Manchester U, UK; Paul.Madden@manchester.ac.uk): *Price, quality and welfare consequences of alternative club objectives in a professional sports league*
- **T. Diasakos** (Collegio Carlo Alberto, ITALY; diasakos@econ.berkeley.edu): *Complexity and bounded rationality in individual decision problems*

Monetary Economics

Chair: G. Antinolfi

- **P. Boel** (Bowdoin College, USA; pboel@bowdoin.edu) and G. Camera (Purdue U, USA): *Heterogeneity and the welfare cost of inflation*
- G. Antinolfi (Washington U St. Louis, USA), **C. Azariadis** (Washington U St. Louis, USA; azariadi@artsci.wustl.edu) and J. Bullard (Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis, USA): *Monetary policy as equilibrium selection*
- R. Duta (U Waikato, NEW ZEALAND), B. Julien (U New South Wales, AUSTRALIA) and **I. King** (U Melbourne, AUSTRALIA; ipking@unimelb.edu.au): *Competition in auctions in a monetary economy*

Noncooperative Group Formation, Part II
Chair: M. Wooders

- **V. Iehle** (Autonomous U Barcelona, SPAIN; viehle@idea.uab.es) and M. Wooders (Vanderbilt U, USA): *Group economies and games*
- **S. Papai** (Concordia U, CANADA; spapai@alcor.concordia.ca): *Individual stability in hedonic coalition formation*

**Economic Growth, Part I**

Chair: E. Dinopoulos

- **F. Sener** (Union College, USA; senerm@union.edu): *R&D policies, endogenous growth and scale effects*
- P. Gustafsson (Stockholm School of Economics, SWEDEN) and **P. Segerstrom** (Stockholm School of Economics, SWEDEN; paul.segerstrom@hhs.se): *Trade liberalization and productivity growth*
- E. Dioikitopoulos (AUEB, GREECE) and **S. Kalyvitis** (AUEB, GREECE; skalyvitis@aueb.gr): *Public capital maintenance and congestion: long-run growth and fiscal policies*
- P. Peretto (Duke U, USA) and **J. Seater** (NCSU, USA; seater@COMFS1.COM.NCSU.EDU): *Factor-eliminating technical change*

**Behavioral Economics**

Chair: M. Hsu

- **M. Bhatt** (Calthech, USA; mbhatt@hss.caltech.edu): *A neural networks model of product advertising*
- **J. Jamison** (U Southern California, USA; julison@berkeley.edu): *Modeling discounting: two brain systems or one?*
- **G. Gerasimou** (U Aegean, GREECE; gerasimou@rho.forthnet.gr): *Preference distance*
- **M. Hsu** (U Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; minghsu@uiuc.edu): *Pure other-regarding preferences and tradeoffs in efficiency and equity*

**Matching Theory**

Chair: W. Thomson

- **L. Ehlers** (U Montreal, CANADA; lars.ehlers@umontreal.ca) and A. Abdulkadiroglu (Duke U, USA): *Controlled school choice*
- **O. Kesten** (Carnegie Melon, USA; okesten@andrew.cmu.edu): *Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random assignment problems?*
• O. Yilmaz (Koc University, TURKEY; ozyilmaz@ku.edu.tr): Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism
• J. Massó (U Autònoma Barcelona, SPAIN; Jordi.Masso@uab.cat) and L. Ehlers (U Montreal, CANADA): Matching markets under (in)complete information

General Economics

Chairs: K. Podczeck and C. D. Aliprantis

• K. Koufopoulos (U Warwick, UK; Kostas.Koufopoulos@wbs.ac.uk): Existence and efficiency of Nash equilibria in insurance markets with adverse selection
• V. Scalzo (U Naples Federico II, ITALY; scalzo@unina.it): A new look on the continuous numerical representation for preference relations

Economic Growth, Part II

Chair: E. Dinopoulos

• C. Le Van (U Paris-1, FRANCE; Cuong.Le-Van@univ-paris1.fr), M. Nguyen (U Paris-1, FRANCE) and T. Luong (U Paris-1, FRANCE): New technology, human capital and growth for developing countries
• E. Ketteni (U Cyprus, CYPRUS; ecpgek1@ucy.ac.cy), T. Mamuneas (U Cyprus, CYPRUS) and T. Stengos (U Cyprus, CYPRUS): The effects of information technology and human capital on economic growth
• K. Wälde (U Würzburg, GERMANY; Klaus.waelde@uni-wuerzburg.de) and O. Posch (U Hamburg, GERMANY): Natural volatility, welfare and taxation
• D. Varvarigos (Loughborough U, UK; D.Varvarigos@lboro.ac.uk): On stabilization policy: are there conflicting implications for growth and welfare?

Clubs and Local Public Goods

Chair: N. Allouch

• F.-C. Kung (City U Hong Kong, Academia Sinica, TAIWAN; kungfc@cityu.edu.hk): Voluntary contributions to multiple public goods in a production economy with widespread externalities
• J. Luque (U Nova de Lisboa, PORTUGAL; luque@fe.unl.pt): On the formation of jurisdictions with heterogeneous agents’ characteristics
• M. Wooders (Vanderbilt U, USA and Warwick U, UK; myrna.wooders@vanderbilt.edu) and M. Faias (U Nova de Lisboa, PORTUGAL): A strategic model of club formation; existence and characterization of equilibrium
• N. Allouch (Queen Mary, U London, UK; n.allouch@qmul.ac.uk), J. P. Conley (Vanderbilt U, USA) and M. Wooders (Vanderbilt U, USA and Warwick U, UK): Anonymous price-taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents
Entrepreneurship III: Occupational Choice

Chair: A. Villamil

- R. M. Hogarth (Barcelona, SPAIN) and N. Karelaia (HEC U Lausanne, SWITZERLAND; Natalia.Karelaia@unil.ch): Excess entry: the roles of judgmental fallibility and overconfidence
- D. Blanchflower (Dartmouth College, USA) and C. Shadforth (Bank of England, UK; chris.shadforth@bankofengland.co.uk): Entrepreneurship in the UK
- A. Mourmouras (IMF, USA; amourmouras@imf.org) and A. Villamil (U Illinois, USA): The effect of financial frictions on economic development: the case of China

Next meeting
The next meeting of The Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory is scheduled to take place in Sicily, Italy in 2009.